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Digital fingerprinting of multimedia data involves embedding information in the content signal and oﬀers protection to the digital
rights of the content by allowing illegitimate usage of the content to be identified by authorized parties. One potential threat to
fingerprinting is collusion, whereby a group of adversaries combine their individual copies in an attempt to remove the underlying
fingerprints. Former studies indicate that collusion attacks based on a few dozen independent copies can confound a fingerprinting
system that employs orthogonal modulation. However, in practice an adversary is more likely to collude with some users than with
other users due to geographic or social circumstances. To take advantage of prior knowledge of the collusion pattern, we propose
a two-tier group-oriented fingerprinting scheme where users likely to collude with each other are assigned correlated fingerprints.
Additionally, we extend our construction to represent the natural social and geographic hierarchical relationships between users by
developing a more flexible tree-structure-based fingerprinting system.We also propose a multistage colluder identification scheme
by taking advantage of the hierarchial nature of the fingerprints. We evaluate the performance of the proposed fingerprinting
scheme by studying the collusion resistance of a fingerprinting system employing Gaussian-distributed fingerprints. Our results
show that the group-oriented fingerprinting system provides the superior collusion resistance over a system employing orthogonal
modulation when knowledge of the potential collusion pattern is available.
Keywords and phrases: multimedia fingerprinting, multimedia forensics, collusion resistance, group-oriented fingerprinting,
multistage colluder identification.
1. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEMDESCRIPTION
With the rapid deployment of multimedia technologies
and the substantial growth in the use of the Internet, the
protection of digital multimedia data has become increas-
ingly critical to the welfare of many industries. Protecting
multimedia content cannot rely merely upon classical se-
curity mechanisms, such as encryption, since the content
must ultimately be decrypted prior to rendering. These clear-
text representations are available for adversaries to repackage
and redistribute, and therefore additional protection mech-
anisms are needed to discourage unauthorized redistribu-
tion. One mechanism that complements encryption is the
fingerprinting of multimedia, whereby tags are embedded
in multimedia content. Whereas data encryption seeks to
prevent unauthorized access to data, digital fingerprinting is
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a forensic technology that provides a mechanism for identi-
fying the parties involved in unauthorized usage of content.
By providing evidence to content owners or digital rights en-
forcement agencies that substantiates the guilt of parties in-
volved in the improper use of content, fingerprinting ulti-
mately discourages fraudulent behavior.
However, in order for multimedia fingerprinting to pro-
vide a reliable measure of security, it is necessary that the
fingerprints can withstand attacks aimed at removing or de-
stroying the embedded information. Many embedding tech-
niques have been proposed that are capable of withstanding
traditional attacks mounted by individuals, such as filtering
and compression. However, with the proliferation of com-
munication networks, the eﬀective distance between adver-
saries has decreased and it is now feasible for attacks to be
mounted by groups instead ofmerely by individuals. Such at-
tacks, known as collusion attacks, are a class of cost-eﬀective
and powerful attacks whereby a coalition of users combine
their diﬀerent marked copies of the same media content for
the purpose of removing the original fingerprints. Finger-
printing must therefore survive both standard distortion at-
tacks as well as collusion attacks.
Several methods have been proposed in the literature to
embed and hide fingerprints in diﬀerent media through wa-
termarking techniques [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. The spread spectrum
watermarking method, where the watermarks have a com-
ponentwise Gaussian distribution and are statistically inde-
pendent, has been argued to be highly resistant to classical
attacks [2].
The research on collusion-resistant fingerprinting sys-
tems involve two main directions of study: designing
collusion-resistant fingerprint codes [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] and ex-
amining the resistance performance of specific watermark-
ing schemes under diﬀerent attacks [12, 13, 14, 15]. With a
simple linear collusion attack that consists of adding noise
to the average of K independent copies, it was concluded
in [13] that, for n users and fingerprints using N samples,
O(
√
N/ logn) independently marked copies are suﬃcient for
an attack to defeat the underlying system with nonnegligi-
ble probability, when Gaussian watermarks are considered.
Gaussian watermarks were further shown to be optimal: no
other watermarking scheme can oﬀer better collusion resis-
tance [13]. These results are also supported by [12]. Stone re-
ported a powerful collusion attack capable of defeating uni-
formly distributed watermarks that employs as few as one to
two dozen independent copies of marked content [15]. In
our previous work, we analyzed the collusion resistance of
an orthogonal fingerprinting system under diﬀerent collu-
sion attacks for diﬀerent performance criteria, and derived
lower and upper bounds for the maximum number of col-
luders needed to thwart the system [16].
Despite the superior collusion resistance of orthogo-
nal Gaussian fingerprints over other fingerprinting schemes,
previous analysis revealed that attacks based on a few dozen
independent copies can confound a fingerprinting system
using orthogonal modulation [12, 13, 16]. Ultimately, for
mass market consumption of multimedia, content will be
distributed to thousands of users. In these scenarios, it is pos-
sible for a coalition of adversaries to acquire a few dozen
copies of marked content, employ a collusion attack, and
thereby thwart the protection provided by the fingerprints.
Thus, an alternative fingerprinting scheme is needed that will
exploit a diﬀerent aspect of the collusion problem in order to
achieve improved collusion resistance.
In this paper, we introduce a new direction for improv-
ing collusion resistance.We observe that some users are more
likely to collude with each other than with other users, per-
haps due to underlying social or cultural factors. We pro-
pose to exploit this a priori knowledge to improve the fin-
gerprint design.We introduce a fingerprint construction that
is an alternative to the traditional independent Gaussian fin-
gerprints. Like the traditional spread-spectrum watermark-
ing scheme, our fingerprints are Gaussian distributed. How-
ever, we assign statistically independent fingerprints tomem-
bers of diﬀerent groups that are unlikely to collude with each
other, while the fingerprints we assign to members within a
group of potential colluders are correlated.
We begin, in Section 2, by introducing our model for
multimedia fingerprinting. Throughout this paper, we con-
sider additive embedding, a general watermarking scheme
whereby a watermark signal is added to a host signal. We
then introduce the problem of user collusion, and focus our
studies on the averaging form of linear collusion attacks. Fur-
ther, in Section 2, we highlight the motivation for our group-
oriented fingerprinting scheme. In Section 3, we present our
construction of a two-tier fingerprinting scheme in which
the groups of potential colluders are organized into sets of
users that are equally likely to collude with each other. We as-
sume, in the two-tier model that intergroup collusion is less
likely than intragroup collusion. The design of the finger-
print is complemented by the development and analysis of
a detection scheme capable of providing the forensic ability
to identify groups involved in collusion and to trace collud-
ers within each group. We extend our construction to more
general group collusion scenarios in Section 4 by present-
ing a tree-based construction of fingerprints. In Section 3.3,
we evaluate the performance of our fingerprinting schemes
by providing experimental results using images. Finally, we
present conclusions in Section 6, and provide proofs of vari-
ous claims in the appendices.
2. FINGERPRINTING AND COLLUSION
In this section, we will introduce fingerprinting and collu-
sion. Collusion-resistant fingerprinting requires the design
of fingerprints that can survive collusion and identify collud-
ers, as well as the robust embedding of the fingerprints in the
multimedia host signal. We will employ spread spectrum ad-
ditive embedding of fingerprints in this paper since this tech-
nique has proven to be robust against a number of attacks
[2]. Additionally, information theory has shown that spread
spectrum additive embedding is near optimal when the orig-
inal host signal is available at the detector side [17, 18], which
is a reasonable assumption for collusion applications.
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We begin by reviewing spread spectrum additive embed-
ding. Suppose that the host signal is represented by a vector x,
which might, for example, consist of the most significant dis-
crete cosine transform (DCT) components of an image. The
owner generates the watermark s and embeds each compo-
nent of the watermark into the host signal by y(l) = x(l)+s(l)
with y(l), x(l), and s(l) being the lth component of the wa-
termarked copy, the host signal, and the watermark, respec-
tively. It is worthmentioning that, in practical watermarking,
before the watermark is added to the host signal, each com-
ponent of the watermark s is scaled by an appropriate factor
to achieve the imperceptibility of the embedded watermark
as well as control the energy of the embedded watermark.
One possibility for this factor is to use the just-noticeable dif-
ference (JND) from a human visual model [19].
In digital fingerprinting, the content owner has a family
of watermarks, denoted by {s j}, which are fingerprints asso-
ciated with diﬀerent users who purchase the rights to access
the host signal x. These fingerprints are used to make copies
of content that may be distributed to diﬀerent users, and al-
low for the tracing of pirated copies to the original users.
For the jth user, the owner computes the marked version of
the content y j by adding the watermark s j to the host signal,
meaning y j = x + s j . Then this fingerprinted copy y j is dis-
tributed to user j and may experience additional distortion
before it is tested for the existence of the fingerprint s j . The
fingerprints {s j} are often chosen to be orthogonal noise-
like signals [2], or are built by using a modulation scheme
employing a basis of orthogonal noise-like signals [11, 20].
For this paper, we restrict our attention to linear modulation
schemes, where the fingerprint signals s j are constructed us-
ing a linear combination of a total of v orthogonal basis sig-





and a sequence {b1 j , b2 j , . . . , bv j} is assigned for each user j.
It is convenient to represent {bi j} as a matrix B, and dif-
ferent matrix structures correspond to diﬀerent fingerprint-
ing strategies. An identity matrix for B corresponds to or-
thogonal modulation [2, 21, 22], where s j = u j . Thus each
user is identified by means of an orthogonal basis signal. In
practice it is often suﬃcient to use independently generated
random vectors {u j} for spread spectrum watermarking [2].
The orthogonality or independence allows for distinguish-
ing diﬀerent users’ fingerprints to the maximum extent. The
simple structure of orthogonal modulation for encoding and
embedding makes it attractive in identification applications
that involve a small group of users. Fingerprints may also be
designed using code modulation [23]. In this case, the ma-
trix B takes a more general form. One advantage of using
code modulation is that we are able to represent more than v
users when using v orthogonal basis signals. One method for
constructing the matrix B is to use appropriately designed
binary codes. As an example, we recently proposed a class of
binary-valued anticollusion codes (ACC), where the shared
bits within code vectors allow for the identification of up to
K colluders [11]. In more general constructions, the entries
ofB can be real numbers. The key issue of fingerprint design
using code modulation is to strategically introduce correla-
tion among diﬀerent fingerprints to allow for accurate iden-
tification of the contributing fingerprints involved in collu-
sion.
In a collusion attack on a fingerprinting system, one or
more users with diﬀerent marked copies of the same host
signal come together and combine several copies to gener-
ate a new composite copy y such that the traces of each of
the “original” fingerprints are removed or attenuated. Sev-
eral types of collusion attacks against multimedia embed-
ding have been proposed, such as nonlinear collusion attacks
involving order statistics [15]. However, in a recent investi-
gation we showed that diﬀerent nonlinear collusion attacks
had almost identical performance to linear collusion attacks
based on averaging marked content signals, when the levels
of mean square error (MSE) distortion introduced by the at-
tacks were kept fixed. In a K-colluder averaging-collusion at-
tack, the watermarked content signals y j are combined ac-
cording to
∑K
j=1 λjy j + d, where d is an added distortion.
Since no colluder would be willing to take higher risk than
others, the λj are often chosen to be equal [10, 12, 13, 14].
For the simplicity of analysis, we will focus on the averaging-
type collusion for the rest of this paper.
2.1. Motivation for group-based fingerprinting
One principle for enhancing the forensic capability of a mul-
timedia fingerprinting system is to take advantage of any
prior knowledge about potential collusion attacks during the
design of the fingerprints. In this paper, we investigate mech-
anisms that improve the ability to identify colluders by ex-
ploiting fundamental properties of the collusion scenario. In
particular, we observe that fingerprinting systems using or-
thogonal modulation do not consider the following issues.
(1) Orthogonal fingerprinting schemes are designed for
the case where all users are equally likely to collude
with each other. This assumption that users collude
together in a uniformly random fashion is unreason-
able. It is more reasonable that users from the same so-
cial or cultural background will collude together with
a higher probability than with users from a diﬀerent
background. For example, a teenage user from Japan
is more likely to collude with another teenager from
Japan than with a middle-aged user from France. In
general, the factors that lead to dividing the users into
groups are up to the system designer to determine.
Once the users have been grouped, we may take ad-
vantage of this grouping in a natural way: divide fin-
gerprints into diﬀerent subsets and assign each subset
to a specific group whose members are more likely to
collude with each other than withmembers from other
groups.
(2) Orthogonality of fingerprints helps to distinguish in-
dividual users. However, this orthogonality also puts
innocent users into suspicion with equal probability. It
was shown in [16] that when the number of colluders
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is beyond a certain value, catching one colluder suc-
cessfully is very likely to require the detection system
to suspect all users as guilty. This observation is ob-
viously undesirable for any forensic system, and sug-
gests that we introduce correlation between the finger-
prints of certain users. In particular, we may introduce
correlation between members of the same group, who
are more likely to collude with each other. Therefore,
when a specific user is involved in a collusion, users
from the same group will be more likely accused than
users from groups not containing colluders.
(3) The performance can be improved by applying appro-
priate detection strategies. The challenge is to take ad-
vantages of the previous points when designing the de-
tection process.
By considering these issues, we can improve on the orthog-
onal fingerprinting system and provide a means to enhance
collusion resistance. The underlying philosophy is to intro-
duce a well-controlled amount of correlation into user fin-
gerprints. Our fingerprinting systems involve two main di-
rections of development: the development of classes of fin-
gerprints capable of withstanding collusion and the devel-
opment of forensic algorithms that can accurately and eﬃ-
ciently identify members of a colluding coalition. Therefore,
for each of our proposed systems, we will address the issues
of designing collusion-resistant fingerprints and developing
eﬃcient colluder detection schemes. To validate the improve-
ment of such group-oriented fingerprinting system, we will
evaluate the performance of our proposed systems under the
average attack and compare the resulting collusion resistance
to that of an orthogonal fingerprinting system.
3. TWO-TIER GROUP-ORIENTED
FINGERPRINTING SYSTEM
3.1. Fingerprint design scheme
As an initial step for developing a group-oriented finger-
printing system, we present a two-tier scheme that consists
of several groups, and within each group are users who are
equally likely to collude with each other but less likely to col-
lude withmembers from other groups. The design of our fin-
gerprints are based upon: (1) grouping and (2) code modu-
lation.
Grouping
The overall fingerprinting system is implemented by design-
ing L groups. For simplicity, we assume that each group can
accommodate up toM users. Therefore, the total number of
users is n = M × L. The choice of M is aﬀected by many
factors, such as the number of potential purchasers in a re-
gion and the collusion pattern of users. We also assume that
fingerprints assigned to diﬀerent groups are statistically in-
dependent of each other. There are two main advantages
provided by independency between groups. First, the de-
tection process is simple to carry out, and secondly, when
collusion occurs, the independency between groups limits
the amount of innocent users falsely placed under suspicion
within a group, since the possibility of wrongly accusing an-
other group is negligible.
Codemodulation within each group
We will apply the same code matrix to each group. For
each group i, there are v orthogonal basis signals Ui =
[ui1,ui2, . . . ,uiv], each having Euclidean norm ‖u‖. We
choose the sets of orthogonal bases for diﬀerent groups to
be independent. In codemodulation, information is encoded





where the symbol cl j is a real value, and all s and u terms are
column vectors with length N and equal energy. We define
the code matrix C = (cl j) = [c1, c2, . . . , cM] as the v × M
matrix whose columns are the code vectors of diﬀerent users.
We have Si = [si1, si2, . . . , siM] = UC, with the correlation
matrix of {si j} as
Rs = ‖u‖2R, R = CTC. (3)
The essential task in designing the set of fingerprints for each
subsystem is to design the underlying correlation matrix Rs.
With the assumption in mind that the users in the same
group are equally likely to collude with each other, we create
the fingerprints in one group to have equal correlation. Thus,
we choose a matrix R such that all its diagonal elements are
1 and all the oﬀ-diagonal elements are ρ. We will refer to ρ as
the intragroup correlation.
For the proposed fingerprint design, we need to address
such issues as the size of groups and the coeﬃcient ρ. The
parameters M and ρ will be chosen to yield good system
performance. In our implementation, M is chosen to be the
best supportable user size for the orthogonal modulation
scheme [16]. In particular, when the total number of users is
small, for instance n ≤ 100, there is no advantage to having
many groups, and it is suﬃcient to use one or two groups.
As we will see later in (13), the detection performance for
the single-group case is characterized by the mean diﬀerence
(1− ρ)‖s‖/K for K colluders. A larger value of the mean dif-
ference is preferred, implying a negative ρ is favorable. On
the other hand, when the fingerprinting systemmust accom-
modate a large number of users, there will be more groups
and hence the primary task is to identify the groups con-
taining colluders. In this case, a positive coeﬃcient ρ should
be employed to yield high accuracy in group detection. For
the latter case, to simplify the detection process, we propose




1− ρei j + √ρai, (4)
where {ei1, . . . , eiM , ai} are the orthogonal basis vectors of
group i with equal energy. The bases of diﬀerent groups are
independent. It is easy to check the fact that Rs = Nσ2uR un-
der this design scheme.
























Figure 1: Model for collusion by averaging.
3.2. Detection scheme
The design of appropriate fingerprints must be comple-
mented by the development of mechanisms that can cap-
ture those involved in the fraudulent use of content. When
collusion occurs, the content owner’s goal is to identify the
fingerprints associated with users who participated in gen-
erating the colluded content. In this section, we discuss the
problem of detecting the colluders when the above scheme
is considered. In Figure 1, we depict a system accommodat-
ing n users, consisting of L groups withM users within each
group. Suppose, when a collusion occurs involving K collud-
ers who form a colluded content copy y, that the number of
colluders within group i is ki and that ki’s satisfy
∑L
i=1 ki = K .













si j + x + d, (5)
where Sci ⊆ [1, . . . ,M] indicates a subset of size |Sci| = ki
describing the members of group i that are involved in the
collusion and the si j ’s are Gaussian distributed. We also as-
sume that the additive distortion d is an N-dimensional vec-
tor following an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and variance σ2d . In this model, the number of colluders K
and the subsets Sci’s are unknown parameters. The nonblind
scenario is assumed in our consideration, meaning that the
host signal x is available at the detector and thus always sub-
tracted from y for analysis.
The detection scheme consists of two stages. The first
stage focuses on identifying groups containing colluders and
the second one involves identifying colluders within each
“guilty” group.
Stage 1—Group detection
Because of the independency of diﬀerent groups and the as-
sumption of i.i.d. Gaussian distortion, it suﬃces to consider
the (normalized) correlator vector TG for identifying groups
possessing colluders. The ith component of TG is expressed
by
TG(i) = (y − x)
T
(
si1 + si2 + · · · + siM
)
√
‖s‖2[M + (M2 −M)ρ] (6)
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,L. Utilizing the special structure of the cor-

























where ki = 0 indicates that no user within group i is in-
volved in the collusion attack. We note that based on the in-
dependence of fingerprints from diﬀerent groups, the TG(i)
are independent of each other. Further, based on the distri-
bution of TG(i), we see that if no colluder is present in group
i, TG(i) will only consist of small contributions. However, as
the amount of colluders belonging to group i increases, we
are more likely to get a larger value of TG(i).
We employ the correlators TG(i)’s for detecting the pres-
ence of colluders within each group. For each i, we compare
TG(i) to a threshold hG and report that the ith group is col-






where the set iˆ indicates the indices of groups including col-
luders. As indicated in the distribution (7), the threshold hG
here is determined by the pdf. Since normally the number
of groups involved in the collusion is small, we can correctly
classify groups with high probability under the nonblind sce-
nario.
Stage 2—Colluder detection within each group
After classifying groups into the colluder-absent class or
the colluder-present class, we need to further identify col-
luders within each group. For each group i ∈ iˆ, because
of the orthogonality of basis [ui1,ui2, . . . ,uiM], it is suﬃ-
cient to consider the correlators Ti, with the jth component
Ti( j) = (y − x)Tui j /




CΦi + ni, (9)
where Φ ∈ {0, 1}M with Φi( j) = 1 for j ∈ Sci, indicates col-
luders within group i via the location of components whose
2158 EURASIP Journal on Applied Signal Processing
values are 1; and ni = UidT/
√‖u‖2, follows an N(0, σ2d IM)











Suppose the parametersK and ki are assumed known, we can
estimate the subset Sci via
Sˆci = arg max|Sci|=ki p
(
Ti|K , Sci, σ2d
)
= the indices of ki largest Tsi( j)’s,
(11)
where the jth component of the correlator vector Tsi is de-
fined as
Tsi( j) = TTi c j =
(y − x)Tsi j√‖s‖2 (12)




∣∣K , Sci, σ2d) = N(µi, σ2dR),














The derivation of (11) and (13) can be found in Appendix A.
However, applying (11) to locate colluders within group i is
not preferred in our situation for two reasons. First, knowl-
edge ofK and ki are usually not available in practice andmust
be estimated. Further, the above approach aims to minimize
the joint estimation error of all colluders and it lacks the ca-
pability of adjusting parameters for addressing specific sys-
tem design goals, such asminimizing the probability of a false
positive and maximizing the probability of catching at least
one colluder. Regardless of these concerns, the observation in
(11) suggests the use of Tsi for colluder detection within each
group.
To overcome the limitations of the detector in (11), we
employ a colluder identification approach within each group
i ∈ iˆ by comparing the correlator Tsi( j) to a threshold hi and
indicating a colluder presence whenever Tsi( j) is greater than
the threshold. That is,
jˆi = argMj=1
{
Tsi( j) ≥ hi
}
, (14)
where the set jˆi indicates the indices of colluders within group
i, and the threshold hi is determined by other parameters and
the system requirements.



















where the Q-function is Q(t) = ∫∞t (1/√2π) exp(−x2/2)dx,
and the values of α1 and α2 depend upon the system require-
ments.
When the fingerprint design scheme in (4) is applied to
accommodate a large number of users, we observe the fol-
lowing:
Tsi( j) =
(y − x)Tsi j√‖s‖2 = Tei( j) + Ta(i),
Tei( j) =
√
1− ρ(y − x)Tei j√‖s‖2 ,
Ta(i) =
√






∣∣K , Sci, σ2d) = N(µei, (1− ρ)σ2d IM),

















Since, for each group i, Ta(i) is common for all Tsi( j)’s, it
is only useful in group detection and can be subtracted in
detecting colluders. Therefore, the detection process (14) in
stage 2 now becomes
jˆi = argMj=1
{
Tei( j) ≥ h
}
. (18)
Now the threshold h is chosen such that
Pr
{

















Note that h is a common threshold for diﬀerent groups. Ad-
vantages of the process (18) are that components of the vec-
tor Tei are independent and that the resulting variance is
smaller than σ2d .
3.3. Performance analysis
One important purpose of a multimedia fingerprinting sys-
tem is to trace the individuals involved in digital con-
tent fraud and provide evidence to both the company ad-
ministering the rights associated with the content and law
enforcement agencies. In this section, we show the per-
formance of the above fingerprinting system under diﬀer-
ent performance criteria. To compare with the orthogonal
scheme [16], we assume the overall MSE with respect to the
host signal is constant. More specifically,
E












‖s‖2 +Nσ2d  ‖s‖2,
(20)
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meaning the overall MSE equals the fingerprint energy.
Therefore, the variance σ2d is based on {ki} correspondingly.
Diﬀerent concerns arise in diﬀerent fingerprinting appli-
cations. In studying the eﬀectiveness of a detection algorithm
in collusion applications, there are several performance cri-
teria that may be considered. For instance, one popular set
of performance criteria involves measuring the probability
of a false negative (miss) and the probability of a false pos-
itive (false alarm) [12, 13]. Such performance metrics are
significant when presenting forensic evidence in a court of
law, since it is important to quantify the reliability of the
evidence when claiming an individual’s guilt. On the other
hand, if the overall system security is a major concern, the
goal would then be to quantify the likelihood of catching
all colluders, since missed detection of any colluder may re-
sult in severe consequences. Further, multimedia fingerprint-
ing may aim to provide evidence supporting the suspicion
of a party. Tracing colluders via fingerprints should work in
concert with other operations. For example, when a user is
considered as a suspect based on multimedia forensic analy-
sis, the agencies enforcing the digital rights can more closely
monitor that user and gather additional evidence that can be
used collectively for proving the user’s guilt. Overall, iden-
tifying colluders through anticollusion fingerprinting is one
important component of the whole forensic system, and it
is the confidence in the fidelity of all evidence that allows
a colluder to be finally identified and their guilt sustained
in court. This perspective suggests that researchers consider
a broad spectrum of performance criteria for forensic ap-
plications. We therefore consider the following three sets of
performance criteria. Without loss of generality, we assume
i = [1, 2, . . . , l], where i indicates the indices of groups con-
taining colluders and l is the number of groups containing
colluders.
3.3.1. Case 1 (catch at least one colluder)
One of the most popular criteria explored by researchers are
the probability of a false negative (Pf n) and the probability
of a false positive (Pf p) [12, 13]. The major concern is to
identify at least one colluder with high confidence without
accusing innocent users. From the detector’s point of view, a
detection approach fails if either the detector fails to identify
any of the colluders (a false negative) or the detector falsely
indicates that an innocent user is a colluder (a false positive).
We first define a false alarm event Ai and a correct detection












Tsi( j) ≥ hi
} (21)












Tei( j) ≥ h
} (22)
for the scheme of (18). Then we have
Pd = Pr
{∃jˆi ∩ Sci 
= ∅} = Pr {∪li=1 Bi}
= Pr {B1} + Pr {B¯1 ∩ B2}















Pf p = Pr
{∃jˆi ∩ S¯ci 
= ∅} = Pr {∪Li=1 Ai}
= Pr {∪i /∈i Ai} + (1− Pr {∪i /∈i Ai})Pr {∪li=1 Ai}
=
[





















These formulas can be derived by utilizing the law of total
probability in conjunction with the independency between
fingerprints belonging to diﬀerent groups and the fact that
pl+1 = pl+2 = · · · = pL since there are no colluders in
{Al+1, . . . ,AL}. Based on this pair of criteria, the system re-
quirements are represented as
Pf p ≤ , Pd ≥ β. (24)
We can see that the diﬃculty in analyzing the collusion
resistance lies in calculating joint probabilities pi’s and qi’s.
When the total number of users is small such that all the
users will belong to one or two groups, stage 1 (guilty group
identification) is normally unnecessary and thus ρ should be
chosen to maximize the detection probability in stage 2. We
note that the detection performance is characterized by the
diﬀerence between the means of the two hypotheses in (13)
and hence is given by (1 − ρ)‖s‖/K . Therefore, a negative ρ
is preferred. Since the matrix R should be positive definite,
1 + (M − 1)ρ > 0 is required. We show the performance
by examples when the total number of users is small, as in
Figure 2a, where n = 100,M = 50, and a negative ρ = −0.01
is used. It is clear that introducing a negative ρ helps to im-
prove the performance when n is small. It also reveals that the
worst case in performance happens when each guilty group
contributes equal number of colluders, meaning ki = K/|i|,
for i ∈ i.
In most applications, however, the total number of users
n is large. Therefore, we focus on this situation for perfor-
mance analysis. One approach to accommodate large n is
to design the fingerprints according to (4) and use a pos-
itive value of ρ. Now after applying the detection scheme
in (18), the events Ai’s and Bi’s are defined as in (22). We
further note, referring to (6), (16), and (17), that the cor-
relation coeﬃcient between TG(i) and Tei( j) is equal to√
(1− ρ)/(M + (M2 −M)ρ), which is a small value close to
0. For instance, with ρ = 0.2 and M = 60, this correlation
coeﬃcient is as small as 0.03. This observation suggests that
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Orthogonal fingerprints
Correlated fingerprints 1 : ρ = −0.01, k = [25 25]
Correlated fingerprints 2 : ρ = −0.01, k = [40 10]


































Figure 2: ROC curves Pd versus Pf p of diﬀerent examples, compared with the orthogonal scheme in [16], with N = 104. In (a), a small
number of users n = 100 and a negative ρ = −0.01 are considered. We haveM = 50 and K = 50. In (b), a large number of users n = 6000
and a positive ρ = 0.4 are considered, where M = 60,α1 = 10−6, and eight groups are involved in collusion, with each group having eight
colluders.
TG(i) and Tei( j)’s are approximately uncorrelated, therefore















































with r0 = ‖s‖
√
1 + (M − 1)ρ/K√M. Note that here we em-
ploy the theory of order statistics [24]. We show an example
in Figure 2b, where n = 6000, L = 100, and there are eight
groups involved in collusion with each group having eight
colluders. We note that this approximation is very accurate
compared to the simulation result, and that our fingerprint-
ing scheme is superior to using orthogonal fingerprints.
To have an overall understanding of the collusion resis-
tance of the proposed scheme, we further study the maxi-
mum resistible number of colluders Kmax as a function of n.
For a given n, M, and {ki}’s, we choose the parameters α1,
which determines the threshold hG, α2, which determines the
threshold h, and ρ, which determines the probability of the















In reality, the value of ρ is limited by the quantization preci-
sion of the image system and ρ should be chosen at the finger-
print design stage. Therefore, ρ is fixed in real applications.
Since, in many collusion scenarios the size |i| would be rea-
sonably small, our results are not as sensitive to α1 and ρ as to
α2, and the group detection in stage 1 often yields very high
accuracy. For example, when |i| ≤ 5, the threshold hG can be
chosen such that α1   and Pr(TG(i) ≥ hG) is suﬃciently
close to 1 for at least one group i ∈ i. Therefore, to simplify
our searching process, we can fix the values of α1. Also, in
the design stage, we consider the performance of the worst
case, where ki = K/|i|, for i ∈ i. One important eﬃciency
measure of a fingerprinting scheme is Kmax, the maximum
number of colluders that can be tolerated by a fingerprinting
system such that the system requirements are still satisfied.
We illustrate an example in Figure 3, where M = 60 is used
since it is shown to be the best supportable user size for the
orthogonal scheme [16], and the number of guilty groups is
up to five. It is noted that Kmax of the proposed scheme (in-
dicated by the dotted and the dashed-dotted lines) is larger
than that of the orthogonal scheme (the solid line) when n
is large. The diﬀerence between the lower bound and upper
bound is due to the fact that ki = K/|i| in our simulations.
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Figure 3: Comparison of collusion resistance of the orthogonal and
the proposed group-based fingerprinting systems to the average at-
tack. Here, N = 104, M = 60, ki = K/|i|, |i| = 5, and the system
requirements are represented by  = 10−3 and β = 0.8.
Overall, the group-oriented fingerprinting system provides
the performance improvement by yielding better collusion
resistance. It is worth mentioning that the performance is
fundamentally aﬀected by the collusion pattern. The smaller
the number of guilty groups, the better chance the colluders
are identified.
3.3.2. Case 2 (fraction of guilty captured versus
fraction of innocent accused)
This set of performance criteria consists of the expected frac-
tion of colluders that are successfully captured, denoted as rc,
and the expected fraction of innocent users that are falsely
placed under suspicion, denoted as ri. Here, the major con-
cern is to catch more colluders, possibly at a cost of accus-
ing more innocents. The balance between capturing collud-
ers and placing innocents under suspicion is represented by
these two expected fractions. Suppose the total number of







































TG(i)≥hG,Tei( j)≥hi | j∈Sci
}
, for i=1, . . . , l,
p0i=Pr
{
TG(i)≥hG,Tei( j)≥hi | j /∈Sci
}
, for i = 1, . . . , l+1,
(28)
and γi j is defined as
γi j =

1, if jth user of group i is accused,0, otherwise. (29)
Based on this pair {ri, rc}, the system requirements are repre-
sented by
ri ≤ αi; rc ≥ αc. (30)
We further notice that TG(i) and Tei( j)’s are approxi-
mately uncorrelated, therefore, we can approximately apply
p1i = Pr{TG(i) ≥ hG}Pr{Tei( j) ≥ h | j ∈ Sci}, for i =
1, . . . , l, and p0i = Pr{TG(i) ≥ hG}Pr{Tei( j) ≥ h | j /∈ Sci},
for i = 1, . . . , l + 1 in calculating ri and rc. With a given n,M,
and {ki}’s, the parameters α1 which determines the threshold
hG, α2 which determines the threshold h, and ρ which deter-











) ≤ αi. (31)
Similarly, finite discrete values of α1 and ρ are considered to
reduce the computational complexity.
We first illustrate the resistance performance of the sys-
tem by an example, shown in Figure 4a, where N = 104,
ρ = 0.2, and three groups involved in collusion with each
group including 15 colluders. We note that the proposed
scheme is superior to using orthogonal fingerprints. In par-
ticular, for the proposed scheme, all colluders are identified
as long as we allow 10 percent innocents to be wrongly ac-
cused. We further examine Kmax for the case that ki = K/|i|
when diﬀerent number of users is managed, as shown in
Figure 4b by requiring r ≤ 0.01 and Pd ≥ 0.5 and setting
M = 60 and the number of guilty groups is up to ten. The
Kmax of our proposed scheme is larger than that of Kmax for
orthogonal fingerprinting when large n is considered.
3.3.3. Case 3 (catch all colluders)
This set of performance criteria consists of the eﬃciency rate
r, which describes the amount of expected innocents accused
per colluder, and the probability of capturing all K colluders,
which we denote by Pd. The goal in this scenario is to capture
all colluders with a high probability. The tradeoﬀ between
capturing colluders and placing innocents under suspicion
is achieved through the adjustment of the eﬃciency rate r.
More specifically, suppose n is large and the detection scheme



















































Correlated: lower bound of Kmax
Correlated: upper bound of Kmax
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Figure 4: The resistance performance of the group-oriented and the orthogonal fingerprinting system under the criteria ri and rc. Here,
N = 104. In (a), we have M = 50, n = 500, ρ = 0.2; Kmax versus n is plotted in (b), where M = 60, the number of colluders within guilty
groups are equal, meaning ki = K/|i|, the number of guilty groups is |i| = 10, and the system requirements are represented by α = 0.01 and
β = 0.5.
in which p0i and p1i are defined as in (27). Based on this pair
{r,Pd}, the system requirements are expressed as
r ≤ α, Pd ≥ β. (33)
Similar to the previous cases, we further notice that TG(i)
and Tei( j)’s are approximately uncorrelated, and we may ap-
proximately calculate p1i’s and p0i’s as done earlier. Using the






















in calculating Pd. With a given n, M, and {ki}’s, the param-
eters α1 which determines the threshold hG, α2 which deter-
mines the threshold h, and ρ which determines the probabil-










) ≤ α. (35)
Similarly, finite discrete values of α1 and ρ are considered to
reduce the computational complexity.
We illustrate the resistance performance of the proposed
system by two examples shown in Figure 5. It is worth men-
tioning that the accuracy in the group detection stage is crit-
ical for this set of criteria, since a miss-detection in stage 1
will result in a much smaller Pd. When capturing all collud-
ers with high probability is a major concern, our proposed
group-oriented scheme may not be favorable in cases where
there are a moderate number of guilty groups involved in
collusion or when the collusion pattern is highly asymmet-
ric. The reason is that, under these situations, a threshold in
stage 1 should be low enough to identify all colluder-present
groups, however, a low threshold also results in wrongly ac-




In this section, we propose to extend our construction to
represent the natural social and geographic hierarchical re-
lationships between users by generalizing the two-tier ap-
proach to a more flexible group-oriented fingerprinting sys-
tem based on a tree structure. As in the two-tier group-
oriented system, to validate the improvement of such tree-
based group fingerprinting, we will evaluate the performance
of our proposed system under the average attack and com-
pare the resulting collusion resistance to that of an orthogo-
nal fingerprinting system.
4.1. Fingerprint design scheme
The group-oriented system proposed earlier can be viewed
as a symmetric two-level tree-structured scheme. The first
level consists of L nodes, with each node supporting P leaves
that correspond to the fingerprints of individual users within
one group. We observe that a user is often more likely to































Figure 5: Performance curves Pd versus r of diﬀerent examples, compared with the orthogonal scheme in [16]. Here, N = 104. In (a),
K = 23, a small number of users n = 40, and a negative ρ = −0.023 are considered. In (b),M = 60, a large number of users n = 600, and a
positive ρ = 0.3 are considered. Three groups are involved in collusion, with numbers of colluders being [32, 8, 8], respectively.
a1 a2









































Figure 6: A tree-structure-based fingerprinting scheme.
collude with some groups than with other groups. If we al-
low for a more general tree structure in the fingerprint de-
sign, we can achieve more flexibility in capturing the col-
lusion dynamics between diﬀerent groups. For instance, we
may consider a simple region-based collusion pattern: users
withinMaryland are more likely to come together in generat-
ing an attacked copy than they are likely to collude with other
users from Texas, and the probability for these two groups
to come together to collude is higher than they would with
users from Asia. We may view this subgroup hierarchy via a
tree structure, as depicted in Figure 6. In this diagram, we as-
sume that (1) users in region i1 are equally likely to collude
with each other with a probability p1 and (2) each user in
region i1 is equally likely to collude with users within region
i2 with a probability p2 and users within other regions cor-
responding to diﬀerent subtrees with a probability p3, where
p1 > p2 > p3. Therefore, it is desirable for us to design a fin-
gerprint tree that matches the large-scale collusion pattern
(e.g., represented by the cultural, social, and geographic re-
lationships among users) in such a way that the fingerprints
on the same branch of the tree are more correlated with each
other than with those on other branches, and correspond-
ingly the associated users on the same branch of the tree are
more likely to collude with each other.
More generally, we design a tree withM levels where each
node at the (m− 1)th level supports a total of Lm nodes. Let
[i1, . . . , iM] indicate the index vector of a user/fingerprint. Ex-











where the a vectors correspond to orthogonal basis vectors
with equal energy ‖a‖ = ‖s‖, each ρj satisfies 0 ≤ ρj ≤ 1, and
ρM = 1−
∑M−1
j=1 ρj . In this design scheme, the correlations be-
tween fingerprints are controlled by adjusting the coeﬃcients
ρi’s, which are determined by the probabilities for users un-
der diﬀerent tree branches to carry out collusion attacks.
4.2. Detection scheme
We now discuss the problem of detecting the colluders when
the proposed fingerprint design scheme in (36) is employed.
For simplicity in analysis, we consider a balanced tree struc-
ture, where the system accommodates n users, and the tree
involvesM levels where each node at the (m− 1)th level sup-
ports Lm nodes. The marked copy for a user with the index
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vector [i1, . . . , iM] is represented as yi1,...,iM = x+si1,...,iM , where
x is the host signal. When a collusion occurs, suppose that a
total of K colluders are involved in forming a copy of col-
luded content y, and the number of colluders within each
level m subregion represented by an index vector [i1, . . . , im]
is ki1,...,im . For instance, for a tree with M = 3, in a subregion
where users are all with indices i1 = 2 and i2 = 1, if s2,1,1
and s2,1,3 are colluders, then k2,1 = 2. We note that, for each
levelm = 1, . . . ,M, we have∑L1i1=1 · · ·∑Lmim=1 ki1,...,im = K . The










sic + x + d, (37)
where ic indicates the index vector of length M, Sc indicates
a vector set of size K , and each element of Sc is an index vec-
tor. We also assume that additional noise d is introduced af-
ter the average collusion and d is a vector following an i.i.d.
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance σ2d . The
number of colluders K and the set Sc are the parameters to
be estimated. We consider the nonblind scenario, where the
host signal x is available at the detector and thus always sub-
tracted from y for analysis.
Using such a formulation, we will address the issue of
detecting the colluders. The tree-structured, hierarchical na-
ture of group-oriented fingerprints leads to a multistage col-
luder identification scheme: the first stage focuses on identi-
fying the “guilty” regions at the first level; at the second stage,
we further narrow down by specifying “guilty” subregions
within each “guilty” region. We continue the process along
each “guilty” branch of the tree until we detect the collud-
ers at the leaf level. More specifically, at each level m, with
m = 1, . . . ,M, and with a previously identified region in-
dexed by i = [i1, . . . , im−1], we report that the subregion in-
dexed by i = [i1, . . . , im] is colluder present when the corre-
lator Ti1,...,im−1 (im) is greater than a threshold hm. That is, for
m = 1, . . . , (M−1), we define stagem in the overall detection
scheme as follows.
Stagem—subregion detection at levelm of the tree structure
With a previously identified region indexed by i =
[i1, . . . , im−1], we need to further examine the subregions in-
dexed by i = [i1, . . . , im] for im = 1, . . . ,Lm. Due to the or-
thogonality of basis {ai1,...,im}, it suﬃces to consider the (nor-
malized) correlator vector Ti1,...,im−1 for identifying subregions





) = (y − x)Tai1,...,im√‖s‖2 , (38)












and ki1,...,im = 0 indicating that no colluder is present within
the subregion represented by [i1, . . . , im]. If many colluders
belong to the sub-region represented by [i1, . . . , im], we are
likely to observe a large value of Ti1,...,im−1 (im). Therefore, the






) ≥ hm}, (41)
where jˆm indicates the indices of subregions containing col-
luders within the previously identified region represented by
[i1, . . . , im−1].
Finally, we note that the individual colluders are identi-
fied at level M (the leaf level). Now with previously identi-
fied region represented by [i1, . . . , iM−1], we have, for iM =




















‖s‖, if ki1,...,iM > 0,
0, otherwise.
(43)






) ≥ hM}, (44)
where jˆM indicates the indices of colluders within the previ-
ously identified region represented by [i1, . . . , iM−1].
In our approach, at each levelm, we specify a desired false


















In summary, the basic idea behind this multistage detection
scheme is to keep narrowing down the size of the suspicious
set. An advantage of this approach is its light computational
burden since, when the number of colluders K is small or the
number of subregions involved in collusion is small, the total
amount of correlations needed can be significantly less than
the total number of users.
4.3. Parameter settings and performance analysis
In this subsection, we will address the issue of setting the pa-
rameters (e.g., how to choose the values of coeﬃcients ρm’s,
thresholds hm’s, and the sizes Lm’s) and examine the perfor-
mance metrics characterized by Pf p and Pd. Due to the mul-
tistage nature of the proposed detection approach, calculat-
ing the overall performance Pf p and Pf n involves computing
the probabilities of joint events. Furthermore, the collusion
pattern will alsomake the analysis of Pf p and Pd complicated.
























Figure 7: Demonstration of the types of false alarm events for a three-level tree structure, where at the leaf level the square-shape nodes
indicate colluders and the circle-shape nodes indicate innocents. (a) The dark and light arrows represent an event in B3 and B2, respectively.
(b) The event A1(2).
We first examine the types of false alarm events pos-
sible for our tree-structured scheme. A false alarm occurs
when the detector claims colluders are present in a colluder-
absent region. A colluder-absent region is characterized by
ki1,...,im = 0. As shown in Figure 7, where the gray rectangles
represent colluder-absent regions, we can characterize false
alarm events in these regions by AM(·),AM−1(·), . . . ,A1(·):
AM
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) ≥ hM∣∣ki1,...,iM = 0},
Am
(










i1, . . . , im, im+1
) | ki1,...,im = 0}.
(47)





i1, . . . , iM












for m = (M − 1), . . . , 1. Denoting the index vectors for the
estimated colluders as {iˆc}, we now have
Pf p = Pr




and form = 2, . . . ,M,
Bm 
{∪Sm (T0(i1) ≥ h1, . . . ,Ti1,...,im−2(im−1)
≥ hm−1,Am
(




where the vector set Sm = {{i1, . . . , im}|{ki1 
= 0, . . . , ki1,...,im−1

= 0, ki1,...,im = 0}}. As we can see, due to the complex nature
of a collusion pattern represented in the tree structure, Pf p is
a complicated function of the collusion pattern.
During the system design process, we normally do not
have knowledge of the location of the colluders. As such, we
use the upper bound of Pf p, which does not require detailed
knowledge of the collusion pattern, to guide our selection
of parameter values. Let K be the total number of collud-
ers. Based on the analysis of probability and order statistics








< L1p1 + K
M−1∑
m=2
Lmpm + Kp, (51)
where p = 1−(1− pM)LM represents the probability of a false
alarm within a subregion as [i1, . . . , iM−1], where all users are
innocent. As we can see, the Lmpm term in the above expres-
sion is due to the type of false alarm event Am. Intuitively, we
want the probability of an event of type Am to decrease with
a decreasing level m. In particular, we want the probability
that a false alarm occurs in an innocent region connected di-
rectly to the root, Pr{B1} to be negligible, thus implying that
α1 is small. This is due to the fact that our tree-structured
fingerprint system can be deployed in such a way that typ-
ically only a very small number of regions at the first level
are involved in collusion, thus a miss-detection is rare at the
first level even with a high threshold h1. To simplify the pa-
rameter setting process, we relate the false alarm probabilities
at diﬀerent levels with a multiplicative factor c. That is, if at
the leaf level we have the probability of a false positive repre-
sented by p, then for the (M − 1) level, we scale p by a factor
of c and use p/c to represent the probability of the events of
type BM−1. We apply this scaling to upper levels in a similar
way. Further, using the upper bound of pm in (48), we can

















−→ αm = 1(
Lmc
) , form =M − 2, . . . , 2.
(52)
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Using this choice of αm and thus hm in (51), we have



















(c − 1) ,
(53)
where o(a) represents a small value compared with a, and c is
a positive constant larger than 1. The detail of this derivation
is provided in Appendix B. Basically, for larger K and p, or
for smaller c, we will see a larger Pf p. Based on the chosen











With this design scheme, we fix the thresholds at levels 1 to
(M−1) and only leave the threshold at the last level adjustable
in our performance evaluation.
Now we proceed to study the behavior of Pd. We have
Pd = Pr












) ≥ h1,∪i2∈{ki1,i2 
=0}C2(i1, i2)}, (56)
while form = 2, . . . , (M − 1),
Cm
(








=0}Cm+1(i1, . . . , im+1)},
CM
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It is worth mentioning that, due to the independency of the
basis vectors a’s in fingerprint design, all events Cm(·)’s at
the same level m are independent of each other. Without
loss of generality, given a region {i1, . . . , im}, we assume that
ki1,...,im+1 






i1, . . . , im












with qi1,...,im( j) = Pr{Cm+1(i1, . . . , im, j)}. Iteratively apply-
ing this relationship, we can calculate the probability of de-
tection Pd for a given collusion pattern. Intuitively, we can
see that Pr{Ti1,...,im−1 (im) ≥ hm} plays an important role
in Pd, thus the more tightly the colluders are concentrated
in a subregion, the higher the Pd is. We want the proba-
bility Pr{Ti1,...,im−1 (im) ≥ hm} to be larger at lower levels,
since a miss-detection in a lower level is more severe. Re-
ferring to the distribution of Ti1,...,im−1 (im) in (41), we note
that Pr{Ti1,...,im−1 (im) ≥ hm} is characterized by the mean










}√ρm‖s‖ = µlowm .
(59)
From this, it is clear that (1/K)√ρm‖s‖ is important in sys-
tem design, since it characterizes the worst case of the detec-
tion performance due to higher levels (e.g., Πmj=1Lj ≥ K). To
simplify our problem, we choose ρ1 = · · · = ρM−1 and L2 =
· · · = LM−1. Since the final decision is made in the last level
and αM is usually low (thus hM is large), we want to maintain
enough power at the Mth level to yield reasonable detection
probability. In our case, we simply choose 1−∑M−1m=1 ρm = 0.5,
meaning half power is kept at the last level. Given the to-
tal number of users n, the WNR, and the total levels M, we
choose L1 and h1 such that Q((µlow1 − h1)/σd) is close to 1
(e.g., 0.99) and α1 < 1/(L1c). This strategy ensures that at
least one colluder-present region will pass the detection at
level 1 with very high probability. We choose LM to maxi-
mize the number of colluders that the system can tolerate.
For instance, based on the example shown in Figure 3, we can
choose LM = 60. Therefore, in addition to choosing L1 and
LM as above, we set other parameters as follows by choosing
ρ1 = · · · = ρM−1 = 0.5(M − 1) , ρM = 0.5,








) , form = 2, . . . , (M − 1).
(60)
Now the overall performance is a function of αM (thus hM)
and c.
We demonstrate the performance of such a fingerprint-
ing system through examples and compare it with a finger-
printing system employing orthogonal modulation. As in the
group-oriented scheme, the overall power of the colluded ob-
servation y is maintained as ‖s‖2 in our simulations for a
fair comparison. We consider a tree structure with four lev-
els, where L1 = 8, L2 = L3 = 5, and L4 = 50, therefore it can
accommodate n = 104 users. Suppose the total number of
colluders K = 40. We first examine a scenario where the col-
lusion pattern is balanced, that is, at each levelm, all nonzero
ki1,...,im ’s are equal. One example is illustrated in Figure 8,
where we choose α1 = 10−3 and c = 10. In this example,
two regions at level 1 include colluders (e.g., k1 = k2 = K/2),
and in turn two subregions at level 2 within each guilty re-
gion from level 1 are colluder present, then one subregion at
level 3 within each guilty region of level 2 is colluder present,
and finally 10 colluders are present within each guilty sub-
region of level 3. This example illustrates the improved col-
lusion resistance that the tree-structured system can provide
when compared to orthogonal fingerprinting.
The previous example illustrates the gain in designing
fingerprints when one has precise knowledge of the collusion
behavior. Sometimes, however, there might be mismatch in
the assumed collusion behavior. In order to illustrate the ef-
fect of designing a group fingerprinting system for a col-
lusion pattern that is substantially diﬀerent from the true
collusion pattern, we built fingerprints using the same tree
structure as in the example illustrated in Figure 8. We then
examined two extreme scenarios, where the collusion pat-
terns are more random. Each collusion pattern involved 60
colluders. Random pattern 1 involves the colluders coming
Group-Oriented Fingerprinting for Multimedia Forensics 2167
Orthogonal fingerprints
Tree-based fingerprints
































Figure 8: Performance curves of one example of the tree-structure-based fingerprinting system with a symmetric collusion pattern, com-
pared with the orthogonal scheme in [16]. Here, n = 104, the number of levels M = 4, and K = 40. (a) The ROC curve Pd versus Pf p is
plotted and (b) the curve of the fractions rc versus ri is shown.
Orthogonal fingerprints
Tree-based fingerprints: random pattern 1















Figure 9: The ROC curve Pd versus Pf p of one example of the tree-
structure-based fingerprinting system with random collusion pat-
terns, compared with the orthogonal scheme. Here n = 104, the
number of levelsM = 4, and K = 60.
together in a totally random manner, representing that all
users are equally likely to collude with each other; while in
random pattern 2, the colluders are randomly distributed in
the first region at level 1. In Figure 9, we provide the ROC
curves, Pd versus Pf p, for both random patterns, as well as for
orthogonal fingerprints. From this figure, we have two obser-
vations: first, when the collusion pattern that the fingerprints
were designed for is similar to the actual collusion pattern, as
in the case of random pattern 2 at the first level, the results
show improved collusion resistance. Second, when there is
no similarity between the assumed collusion pattern and the
true collusion pattern, as in the case of random pattern 1,
orthogonal fingerprints can yield higher collusion resistance
than the tree-based scheme. Therefore, it is desirable for the
system designer to have good knowledge of the potential col-
lusion pattern and design the fingerprints accordingly.
One additional advantage of the tree-structure-based fin-
gerprinting system over the orthogonal one is its computa-
tional eﬃciency, which is reflected by the upper bound of the
expected computational burden of this approach. The upper
bound is in terms of the amount of correlations required as a
function of a set of parameters including the number of col-
luders, the threshold at each level of the tree, and the number
of nodes at each level. We denote by C(n,K) the number of
correlations needed in our proposed detection scheme. De-
noting by E(Am) the number of expected correlations needed
in an event Am and t being the number of colluder-present








Interested readers are referred to Appendix C for details. This
bound is derived for the worst case where the number of the
guilty regions at each level is set to the upper bound t. Clearly,
for a small t, a situation we expect when the colluders come
from the same groups, the computational cost of the tree-
structure-based fingerprinting system is much smaller than
the n correlations needed by fingerprinting systems using or-
thogonal fingerprints.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 10: (a) The host images, (b) colluded images with K = 40, and (c) diﬀerence images for Lena and Baboon under the average attack.
The collusion pattern for Lena image is the same as in Figure 11, and as in Figure 12 for the Baboon image.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ON IMAGES
We now compare the ability of our fingerprinting scheme
and a system using orthogonal fingerprints for identify-
ing colluders when deployed in actual images. In order to
demonstrate the performance of orthogonal, Gaussian fin-
gerprints, we apply an additive spread spectrum watermark-
ing scheme similar to that in [19], where the original host
image is divided into 8 × 8 blocks, and the watermark
(fingerprint) is perceptually weighted and then embedded
into the block DCT coeﬃcients. The detection of the fin-
gerprint is nonblind, and is performed with knowledge of
the host image. To generally represent the performance, the
256 × 256 Lena and Baboon images were chosen as the host
images since they have diﬀerent characteristics. The finger-
printed images have an average PSNR of 44.6dB for Lena,
and 41.9dB for Baboon. We compare the performance of
the thresholding detector under average collusion attack. We
show in Figure 10 the original host images, the colluded im-
ages, and the diﬀerence images. With K = 40, we obtain an
average PSNR of 47.8dB for Lena and 48.0dB for Baboon
after collusion attack and the JPEG compression.
Denoting s j as the ideal Gaussian fingerprint, the ith
component of the fingerprint, indexed by ic, is actually em-
bedded as
sic(i)
t = α(i)sic(i) (62)
with α being determined by the human visual model
parameters in order to achieve imperceptibility. Therefore,







sic(i) + x(i) + d(i), (63)
where the noise d is regarded as i.i.d N(0, σ2d ) distributed.
Due to the nonblind assumption, αi’s are known in the de-
tector side and thus the eﬀects of real images can be partially
compensated by correlating (yt−x) with the α-scaled basis or
fingerprints in the test statistics T(·)’s defined in earlier sec-
tions and adjusting the norm to be ‖st‖ =
√∑N
i=1 α(i)2‖s‖.






yt − x)Tai1,...,im t∥∥st∥∥ (64)
with each component ai1,...,im(i)
t = α(i)ai1,...,im(i).
We illustrate examples where the collusion pattern is
symmetric. We consider a four-level tree structure with L1 =
8, L2 = L3 = 5, and L4 = 50. We present the results
for the Lena image in Figure 11 based on 104 simulations,
where K = 40 and we choose α1 = 10−3 and c = 10.
In this example, one region at level 1 is guilty, while at
levels 2 and 3 we assumed that each guilty region had 2
subregions containing colluders. Finally, 10 colluders are
present within each guilty sub-region at the final level, that
is, level 3. Additionally, we present the results for Baboon im-
age in Figure 12 based on 104 simulations, where K = 40,
α1 = 10−3, and c = 10. In this example, two regions at level 1
are guilty, while at levels 2 and 3 we assumed that each guilty



































Figure 11: One example of the detection performance of the group-oriented fingerprinting system on Lena image under average attack.
Here,M = 4, n = 104, K = 40, and the Lena image with equivalent N = 13691. (a) The curve Pd versus Pf p. (b) The curve rc versus ri.
region had 2 subregions containing colluders. Finally, 5 col-
luders are present within each guilty subregion at level 3. We
can see that the detection performance of the proposed tree-
structure-based fingerprinting system is much better than
that of the orthogonal system under this colluder scenario.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated a method for enhancing the
collusion resistance performance of fingerprinting systems
using orthogonal modulation. We proposed a group-
oriented fingerprinting system by exploiting the fundamen-
tal property of the collusion scenario that adversaries are
more likely to collude with some users than others due to ge-
ographic or social circumstances. With this underlying phi-
losophy, we then introduced a well-controlled amount of
correlations into user fingerprints in order to improve col-
luder identification.
We first developed a two-tier group-oriented fingerprint-
ing system that involved the design of fingerprints and a two-
stage detection scheme for identifying colluders. We evalu-
ated the resistance performance of the proposed system un-
der the average attack by examining diﬀerent sets of perfor-
mance criteria. It was demonstrated that the proposed fin-
gerprinting scheme is superior to orthogonal fingerprinting
system. In particular, as shown in one example, the proposed
scheme can identify all colluders when we allow for up to 10
percent of the innocents to be wrongly accused. In stark con-
trast, a system using orthogonal fingerprints would require
the detection system to suspect almost all users as guilty.
Our work was further extended to a more flexible tree-
structure-based fingerprinting system in order to represent
the natural hierarchical relationships between users due to
social and geographic circumstances. We proposed an eﬃ-
cient and simple scheme for fingerprint design, and proposed
a multistage colluder identification scheme by exploiting the
hierarchical nature of the group-oriented system where the
basic idea is to successively narrow down the size of the suspi-
cious set. Performance criteria were analyzed to guide the pa-
rameter settings during the design process. We demonstrated
performance improvement of the proposed scheme over the
orthogonal scheme via examples. Furthermore, we derived
an upper bound on the expected computational burden of
the proposed approach and showed that one additional ad-
vantage of the tree-structure-based fingerprinting system is
its computational eﬃciency. We also evaluated the perfor-
mance on real images and noted that the experimental results
match the analysis. Overall, by exploiting knowledge of the
dynamics between groups of colluders, our proposed scheme
illustrates a promising mechanism for enhancing the collu-
sion resistance performance of a multimedia fingerprinting
system.
APPENDICES
A. DERIVATION OF (11) AND (13)













1, if j = l,ρ, if j 
= l.
(A.1)

































Figure 12: One example of the detection performance of the group-oriented fingerprinting system on Baboon image under average attack.
Here,M = 4, n = 104, K = 40, and the Baboon image is with equivalent N = 19497. (a) The curve Pd versus Pf p. (b) The curve rc versus ri.
Now assume the parameters K and ki are known, we can es-
timate the subset Sci via





∣∣K , Sci, σ2d)}
= arg min
|Sci|=ki

























































= the indices of ki largest Tsi( j)’s,
(A.2)
where the vector Tsi is defined as
Tsi = CTi Ti = CT
[





i (y − x)
‖s‖ (A.3)
since ‖s‖ = ‖u‖. We can see that Tsi are the correlation
statistics involving the colluded observation y, the host sig-
nal x, and the fingerprints si j ’s. Since Tsi = CTTi, Tsi con-
ditioned on K and Sci is also Gaussian distributed with the



















R = CT Cov {Ti∣∣K , Sci, σ2d}C = σ2dR,
(A.5)
according to the properties of the vector-valued Gaussian
distribution [26].
B. DERIVATION OF (53)
Based on the expression of Pf p in (49)-(50), we have
Pf p ≤
∑M
m=1 Pr{Bm}. Recall the definition of Bm’s and that∑L1
i1=1 · · ·
∑Lm
im=1 ki1,...,im = K . We note that the size |S1| =
|{i1 | ki1 = 0}| ≤ L1, the size of the colluder-present re-
gions satisfying {ki1 
= 0, . . . , ki1,...,im−1 
= 0} is smaller than
K , and therefore that the size of Sm satisfies |Sm| ≤ KLm for
m = 2, . . . ,M. Therefore, by taking advantage of the inde-




} ≤ 1− (1− p1)L1 < L1p1, (B.1)
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} ≤ KPr{T0(i1) ≥ h1, . . . ,Ti1,...,im−2(im−1)
≥ hm−1,∪imAm
(










{∪im Am(i1, . . . , im}}
≤ KPr
{∪im Am(i1, . . . , im}}
≤ K
[
1− (1− pm)Lm] < KLmpm.
(B.2)
By defining p = [1 − (1 − pM)LM ] in the above, we have







} ≤ L1p1 + K
M−1∑
m=2
Lmpm + Kp. (B.3)
By choosing αm = 1/(Lmc) and using that pm < αmLm+1pm+1
for m = 1, . . . , (M − 1), and choosing α1 such that Pr{B1} is
negligible in comparison with other terms Pr{Bm}’s, we now
have Pf p < K p(1 + 1/c + 1/c2 + · · · + 1/cM−1 + o(1/cM−1)) <
2Kp. Therefore, (53) is obtained.
C. DERIVATION OF (61)
We denote by C(n,K) the number of correlations needed
in our proposed detection scheme. Denoting by E(Am) the
number of expected correlations needed in an event Am,
t being the number of colluder-present subregions at level
(M − 1), and C (detection) and C (false alarm) being the
number of expected correlations needed in correct detections
and false alarms, respectively, we have
C(n,K) = C (detection) + C (false alarm). (C.1)
Suppose all the detections for colluder-present subregions
are truthful, meaning no miss-detection occurs at any stage,
then




Recalling that the false alarms can be categorized into event
types Am’s and that the number of each type of event Am is
less that tLm, we have




















) = αmLm+1E(Am+1) = · · · = αm(ΠM−1j=m+1Ljαj)LM
= αm 1
cM−(m+1)
LM , form = 1, . . . , (M − 2),
(C.4)
by referring to αm = 1/(Lmc). Therefore,































Putting C (detection) and C (false alarm) together, and as-

















Therefore, (61) is obtained. In addition, the above bound is
loose, since it is derived for the worst case where the number
of the guilty regions at each level is set as the upper bound t.
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